Individuality, Collectivity and the Intersubjective Constitution of Intentionality

Avant, Vol. XI, No. 2, doi: 10.26913/avant.2020.02.12
published under license CC BY-NC-ND 3.0

Patrizio Lo Presti orcid-id
Depertment of philosophy, Lund University, Sweden
Department of logic, history and philosophy of science, UNED, Madrid
Patrizio.Lo_Presti @

Received 26 August 2019; accepted 6 April 2020; published Online First 11 July 2020  Download full text

Abstract: This paper argues that first-person singular I- and first-person plural we-intentionality are constituted in normative second-person relations. Their relata are individuals who mutually recognize each other as loci of responsibility. Such relations constitute an I–You, which is argued to be sufficient for both singular I- and plural we-intentionality. Whenever there is I-intentio-nality there is we-intentionality, because whenever the relevant second-person relations obtain, conditions sufficient for both are satisfied. Consequently, the possibility of autonomous individual I-intentionality as well as plurally shared we-intentionality depends on at least two individuals involved in normative mutual recognition. Neither individual is an intentional ‘I’ independently of entering the I–You, and when they do so they are an intentional ‘we.’

Keywords: intentionality; individuality; intersubjectivity; normativity; collectivity; autonomy; authority; inferentialism


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