On Music’s Subtle Expressiveness

Myriam Albor
Institute for Philosophical Research, UNAM
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
myriamalbor@gmail.com

Abstract

I suggest that emotions are not the primary affective attitude towards music. If we are to explain music’s expressiveness according to the Resemblance Theory, that theory should be extended to include feelings. Because of the lack of intentionality in music and the dearth of universal emotional gestures to explain the subtlety of music’s expressive power, explaining this expressiveness by making recourse to music’s relationships with emotions is bound to face challenges. I will argue that, even though the movements in music associated with musical expressiveness might not necessarily be associated with emotions, they might very well be associated with certain feelings of the movement itself.

Keywords: emotions; expressive qualities; feelings; music’s subtle gestures; musical expressiveness; musical gestures; Resemblance Theory.

In his seminal book On the Musically Beautiful, Eduard Hanslick claimed that emotions\(^1\) are not the content of music. Even though I want to argue in favor of musical expressiveness, I consider that the grounds Hanslick used to argue against the relationship between emotions and music are quite accurate. Let us start by reviewing them.

Hanslick considered that emotions are not only dependent upon physiological conditions, but also upon ideas, judgments, and rational thought. Emotions are thus intelligible. His account is consistent with what became known as a “cognitive approach” to the analysis of emotions, and what is highlighted by such an account is the fact that emotions are intentional. Contrastingly, music does not seem to be able to embrace intentionality. One of the theories of musical expressiveness that has successfully dealt with the challenges that

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\(^1\) The term Hanslick actually used is “feelings,” but he used it as I use the term “emotions.” As I will explain further on, I take “emotions” to be complex processes that include various other processes such as intentionality, appraisals, action tendencies, physiological changes, monitoring, and feelings. I interpret “feelings” in turn as phenomenological readouts of bodily and/or cognitive states of the individual. It should be clear that feelings are elements of emotions, but that not everything an individual feels (e.g., a pain in the foot) is necessarily a part of an emotional process.
the lack of intentionality poses is the Resemblance Theory, versions of which have been set forth by Peter Kivy and Stephen Davies. However, this theory has the serious limitation of providing an explanation for very general expressive properties that do not cover the scope of music’s subtle expressiveness. The aim of this paper is to suggest broadening the scope of the Resemblance Theory in order to include the resemblance to feelings as a significant source of music’s subtle expressiveness.

I will begin by exposing Hanslick’s arguments against the possible theories that could account for a relationship between music and emotions; i.e., the arousal approach, the expression approach, and the expressive qualities approach (a.k.a. the Resemblance Theory). I will then present the Resemblance Theory, along with some historical examples that will shed light upon the different kinds of resemblances with affective phenomena to be found in music. It will then become evident that in order to continue the debate we must clarify and agree upon what emotions are. Thus, next I will briefly review the arguments in favor of emotion theories. Finally, I will present my own suggestion, which, again, is to extend the Resemblance Theory to include a resemblance to feelings related to movement.

Hanslick’s rejection

The main argument Hanslick poses against the idea of music being expressive of emotions is that music does not seem to be able to embrace intentionality. Music cannot express emotions, according to Hanslick, because it cannot represent the emotion’s object or its cognitive elements. In other words, emotions are about something, and that “aboutness” usually cannot be found in music. According to the cognitive approach, in an emotional process there are some beliefs that are directed toward an object—the object of the emotion; and these beliefs are what makes any emotion specific. So Hanslick considered that it is impossible to have an emotion of, say, love without the representation of a beloved person, and so forth.

The feeling of hope cannot be separated from the representation of a future happy state which we compare with the present; melancholy compares past happiness with the present. These are entirely specific representations or concepts. Without them, without this cognitive apparatus, we cannot call the actual feeling “hope” or “melancholy”; it produces them for this purpose. If we take this away, all that remains is an unspecific stirring, perhaps the awareness of a general state of well-being or distress. (Hanslick 1891: 9)

Now then, we can survey our options for characterizing music’s relationship with emotions as follows: Either a direct relationship (as if the emotion belonged to the music itself) or an indirect relationship (when it is not the music that has an emotion, for music rather represents it). A direct relationship between music and emotions as possession is obviously not the best way to explain musical expressiveness. For indeed, if emotions strongly depend on cognitive activity and physiological responses, they have to be held by a sentient

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2 I will be referring strictly to non-programmatic instrumental music.
and possibly even rational being). Since music is not a sentient or rational being, music cannot have emotions, nor express them as if it were the emotion’s subject. To attribute emotions to the music itself would be to commit the pathetic fallacy.\(^3\)

On the other hand, characterizing the relationship as indirect comes with its own challenges. If the relationship between music and emotions that we are supposing is indirect, this would mean that it is either someone else that is experiencing the emotion, or that music represents the emotion. And so in the attempt to understand the relationship between music and emotions, we should begin by wondering whose emotions we care about, whether the composer’s, the performer’s, the listener’s, or none. Thus there are mainly three perspectives to explain musical expressiveness from an indirect approach: an expression account (for which music would be expressive insofar as the composer or the performer expresses her emotions through the music she makes); an arousal account (according to which music is expressive in that it arouses the listeners with emotions); and the expressive qualities approach (for which music itself possesses expressive features that are related to emotions in such a way that it can represent emotions).\(^4\)

Hanslick argued against these three ways of music’s indirect relationship with emotions, and his arguments also focus on the lack of intentionality in the musical experiences, combined with a cognitive account of emotions, according to which emotions are necessarily intentional. This is a reconstruction of Hanslick’s arguments:

1. Against arousal: There is no intentional object in pure music. Therefore, the listeners’ emotional response is not about the music. Thus, their emotional arousal cannot constitute an account about the expressiveness of music.
2. Against expressive qualities: There is no strong connection between the musical formal characteristics, and the emotions and therefore the “expressive qualities” are irrelevant. That is because Hanslick considers that intentionality is absolutely necessary in order to constitute an emotion, and that the “expressive qualities” that music presents can be related to emotions only in a vague fashion if they are exhibited without the relevant belief that defines any emotion. Thus, since emotions are definite due to their intentionality and a relevant belief which music does not present, it follows that music’s expressive qualities cannot refer to any particular emotion.

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\(^3\) However, if we do attribute emotions to the music anyway, that might be because there is another sense in which we say a musical piece is, say, sad, which does not commit us to the claim that the musical piece (as a non-sentient being) is undergoing an emotional episode. Rather, as Stephen Davies suggests (1994), we may say a musical piece is sad in the same way we say a mask is sad because it possesses certain features that we find characteristic of sadness. Nevertheless, I consider that this other sense would be better explained as an indirect relationship.

\(^4\) There are more recent and presumably stronger versions of the expression and arousal theories. The “persona theory,” defended by Jenefer Robinson (2005) and Jerrold Levinson (1990, 2005), stands as a contemporary version of the expression theory, of which we will get to talk further on. On the other hand, Matravers (1998) has put forth a stronger version of the arousal theory than the traditional one. According to Matravers, music arouses the listener with a feeling, which she then categorizes as an emotion. For the sake of the clarity of the argument, however, I will for now merely sketch the traditional versions of the expression and the arousal theories.
3. Against expression: From the claim that there is no intentional object in music and, hence, no relevant object-directed belief, plus the claim that there is not a strong connection between music and expressive qualities, it also follows that the composer cannot really express a definite emotion through the manipulation of the matter.

Indeed, one of the most challenging problems to explain musical expressiveness in terms of emotions is the lack of intentionality in musical “emotional” experiences, and that seems to be a necessary condition for emotions to happen. However, even if it were the case that we have a belief toward music itself that could constitute the emotion we are aroused with, it still seems that our arousal cannot constitute musical content, because it is located outside music itself. In effect, in that case we would be explaining musical expressiveness in terms of something music essentially lacks: our emotional state. Moreover, musical expressiveness would be dependent on a person actually being emotionally aroused by the music, which means that if at any particular moment of the listening, the person is, say, distracted, and fails to be emotionally aroused, the music itself would lose its expressiveness. That seems to be a very counter-intuitive claim.

The same argument applies to the expression account, which focuses on the composer’s or the performer’s emotions. The expression account suggests that either the composer or the performer is actually feeling a certain emotion that gets expressed through the music she makes by means of the manipulation of the shape of the sounds and the silence. In this case, however, it is still an external person who undergoes the emotion. As we see, that would define musical expressiveness in terms of an external person’s emotional state. However, it seems that we would call music expressive even if it lacked a connection to such a state.

The main concern regarding the expression and the arousal theories is better expressed as follows: The composer’s, the performer’s, or the listener’s emotions are not part of the music itself. If we are trying to define musical expressiveness, how would this definition be dependent upon something that is not part of what is being defined? It is not my aim to deny that music arouses emotions in the listeners, or that the composers or the performers experience certain emotions that they relate to their musical creations. Nevertheless, this is exactly the relationship that should be explained.

I am perfectly comfortable in conceding that music has a causal relationship with emotions; namely, that the composer had certain intentions while modeling her composition, and thus that she decided to utilize certain elements and arrangements in order to achieve her goals that might or might not be of the emotional type. However, that does not mean that the listener’s, the performer’s, or the composer’s emotions constitute intrinsically music’s expressiveness. The relationship that seems to be possible between the composer’s emotional states and her music is rather that of an efficient cause, but it should be understood that an efficient cause is definitely not necessarily a constituent parthood, and therefore that it would not be enough to define music’s expressiveness.
On the other hand, the listener’s emotional arousal can also be explained through a causal relationship. Indeed, very often we feel emotionally aroused while listening to the music, and it is not rare to hear arguments that support the view that music is expressive of emotions insofar as it arouses us, the listeners, with certain emotions. Though this is a fact that needs explanation, even if we directly concede it, it seems that the emotional arousal would at best prove another causal relationship between music and the listener’s emotions, but not a constituent parthood as well.

Therefore, the counterargument against the arousal and expression theories would be the same, namely, that the bond between people’s emotions and music is not a necessary one, while the causal role conceded to it is too weak to provide by itself a satisfactory answer to what it means for music itself to be expressive. Thus, the challenge for new formulations of these theories would be either to provide reasons to think that this bond between music and people’s emotions is indeed necessary after all, or to support the claim that a necessary bond is not really needed. Otherwise, the foundations for such accounts would remain undermined.

Nevertheless, when it comes to the emotional intentionality toward music, Hanslick seems to to be right, and not only about musical emotional expression, but also about musical emotional responses, and the expressive qualities that music might exhibit. Notably, there is a parallel problem concerning the listener’s response, because she typically lacks the beliefs that would make the music the response’s object, though it is to the music that she responds. Although some people believe that music itself is our intentional object during a musical emotional experience, at least for the interesting cases we can see that such possibility seems very unnatural and forced, given the way intentionality in common emotions is understood. So for example if we are angry, there is an object (a person or a situation) toward which we direct our anger. Moreover, we suppose that an offense has been given, either toward us or toward someone we care about. It seems that you cannot be angry unless you have something or someone to get angry at, plus a belief that you have been offended. In the case of music, however, it is not obvious at all that we are actually angry at the music. We are not sad because we believe that we have suffered a loss because of some musical features. On the other hand, in the case of music’s expressive qualities, Hanslick considers that it is impossible for music to embrace the representation of emotions without utilizing a linguistic plot that could scaffold our intentional attitude. And even in those cases, the music itself is not what is representing the emotion; this is accomplished by the lyrics attached to it. That constitutes pretty much Hanslick’s argument, and its forcefulness is derived, to a great extent, from the intentionality that we fail to exhibit during our musical “emotional experiences,” and that emotions seem to require in the first place.

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5 Indeed, there are some unproblematic cases in which music can indeed be the intentional object of an emotional arousal. For example, I might get disappointed by a piece of music because it is composed incompetently, or upset because the performer did not play it well. However, these are cases that are not relevant in explaining music’s expressiveness.
Yet before going any further, let us briefly consider a related counterargument to a hard expression account, which has led to the so-called “persona theory”—a variant of the expression theory that presumes to avoid Hanslick’s objections. Given that musical emotional expression would require the author’s sincerity (since the emotion expressed is the one held by the composer or performer), she has to genuinely experience an emotion in order to musically express it. Hence, the expression theory faces the challenge of either explaining why happy composers can create sad music (for example), or accepting that the musical piece did not express the composer’s emotion, nor any other emotion on its own.  

In order to avoid such problems, contemporary versions of the expression theory defend that it is not the composer’s or performer’s emotion what is expressed by music, but rather those of an implied author or, to keep Jenefer Robinson’s terms, an imagined persona. Robinson follows Edward T. Cone’s musical analysis and considers that the emotion we perceive or infer from musical artworks is rather an emotion that we as perceivers attribute to an implied author or to a hypothetical persona. The suggestion is that there is a “persona” that is imagined by the listener, but also contained in the music, and that is, nevertheless, distinguishable from the listener herself. This persona, Robinson argues, is the one that undergoes the emotions set forth by the temporal process that music implies, and the one that makes it possible to attribute to the music complex emotions.

A fictional or virtual agent whose emotions are expressed in the music, and that … can be experienced as expressing more complex emotions, such as hopefulness or resignation, as well as blends of emotion, and emotions that develop and change over time. A complex piece of music may have a composed expressive trajectory or musical “plot,” which dramatizes a psychological journey by a persona. (Robinson & Hatten 2012: 71)

But of course, as Robinson rightly foresees, we may ask whether her theory has not passed surreptitiously from being an expression account focused on the artist to the arousal perspective where a perceiver imagines whatever emotions she wants to attribute to an also imagined persona.

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6 Along with the variants of this counterargument; e.g., an emotional episode is not likely to last for as much time as the creation of some artworks such as paintings would take, and therefore it is not likely to be the case that the actual emotion of the artist is the one that is being expressed.

7 As it has been said, Jerrold Levinson also defends a Persona Theory (1990, 2005), arguing that music is expressive because we experience it as if it were a narrative about an imagined persona. However, for the argumentation I am going to focus on Robinson’s version of the persona theory.

8 Edward T. Cone’s outstanding book, The Composer’s Voice (1982), is the source of the idea of an implied persona in musical experiences. Cone conceived of music as a sort of narration and claimed that, while it might be possible to offer a musical analysis that neglects this narrative character of music, such an analysis (or a listening) would overlook essential features of musical expressiveness that would only show up when this narrative flow of music was taken into consideration. Also he claimed that in order to recognize and follow this narrative character of music the listener must consider the music as if it had an implied narrator; i.e., that the listener must imagine a persona whose utterances are the expressive components of the work.
It now begins to sound as if expression is not something brought off by an author but something detected by a reader. But as I have stressed throughout this book, experiencing and interpreting artworks is a two-way process. However much work the reader has to do, the actual author has a big say in how the reader experiences the work (Robinson 2005: 264).

It is not surprising that Robinson stresses that the emotion the audience attributes to the persona is somehow warranted by the work itself or by the author’s “say.” To me, this is precisely the core debate, and I do not think it is sufficiently endorsed in Robinson’s theory. Although this is not a paper dedicated to arguing about the plausibility of the persona theory, let me just express that my main concern with it is that the bond between the listener’s imagination of the hypothetical persona’s experiences and the musical characteristics has not been established as to claim that such imagination could constitute music’s expressiveness. Firstly, it is not true that we always imagine a persona while hearing music, so that this fact could not explain why we usually experience music as emotionally expressive. Secondly, the limits to the imagination of the listener are not clearly stated, for everything can be just an effect of the listener’s inventiveness and it does not seem clear why Robinson argues that these emotions are aesthetically justified by the music itself. For indeed the listener is supposed to carefully follow the musical flow, and so the “emotional story” that she comes up with should be determined by the music itself. Unfortunately, just appealing to the intentions or the “big say” of the composer does not really help, since if the composer’s intentions are to be achieved, the discussion should be nevertheless focused on the expressive qualities she imparts to the work.

Thus I suggest digging deeper in the subject of music’s expressive qualities and try to explain their relevance to musical expressiveness, and see whether it is possible to sort the difficulties that the lack of intentionality poses. For indeed if we are going to defend musical expressiveness, it is important to explain it through characteristics that actually belong to the music. However, that does not mean that we are to deny the arousal or the expression facts (because indeed they occur), nor the relationship that they might have with music’s expressive qualities. Furthermore, as Malcolm Budd suggests (2003: 24–25), if there were other affective phenomena that do not include intentionality and could be successfully related to music’s expressive qualities, there would be a possibility to avoid Hanslick’s arguments.

Expressive qualities

Was Hanslick right about his denial of the relevance of expressive qualities in music? That is certainly something that has to be examined with much more detail. The answer depends on our perspective of what emotions are, and particularly on the role intentionality plays in

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9 Robinson argues that the only thing required is to suggest that this would be a richer way to listen to music and not necessarily the only one.

10 For further discussion on the subject of the persona theory, see Davies (1997: 108).
our emotional experiences. So we should take a closer look in order to see if there is a possibility to suggest that the relationship between the expressive qualities and emotions is strong enough to support a musical expressiveness account. In order to do so, let me review Alan Tormey’s\textsuperscript{11} explanation of the difference between “expressiveness” and “expression.”

Tormey considers that any expression is necessarily intentional. Obviously, music itself would fail to express, since it is not an agent with intentional attitudes. Nevertheless, as Tormey points out, it is not the same thing to have, say, a sad expression as to be an expression of sadness, given that an expression of an emotion cannot occur in the absence of the emotion, while the sadness-like behavior can indeed occur without sadness at all.

Nevertheless, Tormey considers that the connection between a “sad expression” and an “expression of sadness” does not allow us to make an inference from the former to the latter. A cruel facial expression does not imply that the person is actually cruel or inclined to cruelty, and that is to suggest that the \( x \) expression does not logically imply an expression of \( x \) whatsoever. Nevertheless, this dissociation between the \( x \) expression and the expression of \( x \) enables us to project certain intentional attitudes as emotions into the nonhuman world by virtue of some objects displaying behavioral characteristics associated with emotions.

The concept of an expression implies the warranting of certain inferential structures, and it cannot be located by scrutiny of the descriptions of behavior alone, unless those descriptions include among their truth conditions the relevant inferential moves. Explosive laughter, a facial grimace, a shudder, or a periodic tic are, in themselves, neither expressive nor nonexpressive, and only if we have reason to connect the behaviour inferentially with some desire, belief, intent, or conflict are we entitled to treat it as an expression. (Tormey 1971: 45)

As such, the behavior might be part of the expression, but it is not the whole. In the case of art we can say that even though the expressive behavior may be somehow displayed, that does not imply that it is genuine expression that we are encountering. In effect, what is in consideration is not to be found in an actual intentional expression of, say, an actor’s inner state, but rather in the tissue of characteristics the work of art presents, where some of them are set forth in such a form that is prone to make us relate them to particular emotional states.

The Expression Theory considers that the artist’s expression depends on her being engaged in doing something different from just giving way to an impulse, because she is also shaping certain materials to “embody” her sentiment. In his critique of this theory, Tormey argues that the difference that we may agree exists between the mere emotional impulse and “artistic expression” might suggest that the latter is not expression at all, rather than being the only authentic expression, as it has been many times (romantically) described. Tormey claims that the error of the expression theory consists in assuming that the existence of expressive qualities in a work of art implies an act of expression as well, as if there was a necessary link between the qualities of the art work and certain states of the artist,

\textsuperscript{11} In the second half of the 20th century, some harsh critiques of the romantic expression theory saw the light: O. K. Bouwsma’s (1950), John Hosper’s (1955), and Alan Tormey’s (1971), of which I am only going to focus on Tormey’s.
which may or not exist and, furthermore, might very well be irrelevant. (Tormey 1971: 104) Hence, the same reasoning can be applied to the case of music, where the existence of expressive qualities does not allow us to infer an act of expression by the artist by assuming that she is in a particular “inner state.”

Given the aforementioned difficulties surrounding the arousal and expression approaches, Peter Kivy (1989) and Stephen Davies (1994) have suggested that music presents the emotion’s appearances as expressive qualities, in accordance with what Tormey has suggested. For them, music displays certain characteristics (a.k.a. expressive qualities) that are related to emotions. However, they do not consider that the emotion actually has to exist, nor that it is necessarily held by the composer or the audience (though it might very well happen), for only the appearance of the emotional behavior is required for musical expressiveness. The relevant aim is to clarify the kind of relationship that exists between the expressive qualities and the emotions, so that a musical expressiveness account could be built upon it.

Kivy considers that the relationship is that of resemblance. So, the musical form would resemble some emotional external features such as gestures that we can recognize as characteristic behavior of certain particular emotional state. Thus, music can present the “form” of recognizable emotional features, and that is why Kivy’s idea is that listeners are able to recognize the emotion that in this sense is depicted by the music. Of course, the obvious questions are, firstly, what is an emotion’s appearance, and secondly, whether the action required by the listener is indeed that of recognizing emotional features in music. Even though I do not have time to develop this idea any further here, I do not think Kivy’s answer is wrong, but that it is an incomplete explanation of what we mean when we refer to a musical work as “expressive.”

In Davies’ account, however, the emotional features that music presents are mainly those that have to do with motion, so that the relevant characteristics that we should take into consideration are more of the kind of gaits and movement gestures, rather than of static images such as facial gestures.

My claim is that musical movement invites attention to expressiveness because, like human action and behavior (and unlike random process), it displays order and purposiveness. Musical movement is invested with humanity not merely because music is created and performed by humans but because it provides a sense of unity and purpose. We recognize in the progress of music a logic such that what follows arises naturally from, without being determined by, what preceded; in this, musical movement is more akin to human action than to random movement or to the fully determined movements of a nonhuman mechanism. This feature of music, as I have said, arises from the character of musical materials themselves, not solely from the recognition that human hands shape those materials. (Davies 1994: 229)
Although true, there is something else to movement that interests us. Why does movement seem so relevant for musical expressiveness? Moreover, even if music iconically presents movements that are related to affective phenomena, what is the action a listener must undertake? Is she supposed to simply recognize the features of the musical piece as similar to those of humans under a particular emotional state, or is she supposed to get aroused after all?

At first glance, what seems to be more difficult to clarify here is the link between the music and the attitude an individual has toward it that could explain why she calls a musical piece expressive of emotions. On the one hand, it seems that we are facing a contradiction that is hard to leave aside, because I have been arguing that we should focus on the characteristics that music itself has in order to attempt to explain musical expressiveness, rather than paying attention to the emotions that the composer, the performer, or the listeners might be actually experiencing, since that would be a logical error. However, at the same time it also seems counter-intuitive to leave aside any relationship with actual emotional experiences the individuals may have toward music. Indeed, it feels quite uncomfortable to offer a theory of musical expressiveness that simply eliminates of people’s musical emotional experiences. Indeed, if this pure, free of the individual’s experiences account could be offered, it would be of no importance whether Kivy suggests that the resemblance between music and certain emotion’s features is to be “recognized” as expressive qualities in a cold “cognitive” state, or whether the listener is actually experiencing any emotion, since, anyway, the listener would be of no importance whatsoever to a definition of musical expressiveness.

The important question is whether an account of musical expressiveness could actually be offered without taking into consideration people’s emotional experiences toward music, focusing only on the characteristics music itself has. However, what I have been suggesting is that the emotional experiences people have toward music are not constituent parts of musical expressiveness, although they might have an important causal relationship with it. So, we should recognize the importance of the emotional musical experiences that people have, while bearing in mind that they are neither sufficient, nor necessary characteristics of music’s expressiveness.

Returning to the Resemblance Theory, its central claim is that music is expressive of emotions in that it presents emotional characteristics in its appearance, Davies maintains that we are legitimately entitled to say that a mask is sad because it possesses features that we relate to sadness (the frown) even though we all understand that the mask is not actually a human being experiencing sadness. Davies claims that this is so because there is a second and legitimate use of a claim of the type “X is sad” that includes cases as the mask one, where we are concerned with the sadness-look, rather than with the emotion proper. In the same way, we can say that a piece of music is, say, sad, if it exhibits the relevant appearance of sadness, without getting entangled either with the assumption of believing that music is a sentient being, or with the discussion of locating the emotion outside the music itself.
Let us consider the following claim: “Appearance emotionalism maintains that the expressiveness of a piece of music is an objective and literally possessed but response-dependent property of that piece.” (Davies 2006: 180) It is claimed that a piece of music is expressive of a particular emotion in an objective and literal sense given the second use that emotion words have that I have just mentioned. That is to say that the piece is not, say, metaphorically expressive of sadness, but rather that it is objectively and literally sad, but utilizing this second use of emotional terms. However, musical expressiveness is also a response-dependent property because it also hangs on its ability to produce a particular response or experience in a listener of a certain kind. Davies considers that color and pitch are examples of response-dependent properties, since the color experience is not only dependent upon the objective properties the object may have, but also on the perceiver’s capacity to perceive things as colored. Likewise, the experience of pitched sound is not only a matter of the properties of sound itself, for it also hangs on the particular capacity of the listener to hear the sounds as pitched. Another musical element that would work as an example is melody. Indeed, it is not obvious that other animals experience melodies as a conjunction of ordered sounds that make sense in the way we experience melodies, and not only as crude sounds or noises. In the same fashion, musical expressiveness, albeit objective in the sense that it depends on properties the object itself has, is also response-dependent.

But in order for emotions characteristic in appearance to be recognizable by the auditor or to elicit the appropriate responses, it would be necessary that the emotion appearances were distinctive for that particular emotion, so that it becomes unnecessary to make any reference to the intentional object of the emotion (which music cannot embrace). Thus, the emotion characteristics relevant to this second use of the emotion words—emotion characteristics in appearances—are those characteristics that show a particular expression or behavior that is perceived as sufficient evidence for the emotion in question. In Davies’ words:

To see movement as flight (to or from) is to recognize a relation between the action and its object. Where there is no such object, there is movement, but not flight as such. By contrast, radiant smiles can be seen as expressive of happiness in the absence of evidence about the object of the smiling person’s happiness. (Davies 1994: 225)

However, the recognizable emotions from the appearances are far less than the complete set of emotions, so to speak. Indeed, some emotions might be easily recognizable from the behavioral characteristics they exhibit, but for many others a reference to their intentional objects or beliefs is still in order.

On the other hand, it remains to be explained which are the emotional characteristics that apparently music can resemble and in virtue of which we can call certain musical works expressive of particular emotions. However, this idea is much older than Kivy’s and Davies’ proposals, for it was implicitly present throughout the history of music, being particularly discussed during the Humanism and the early Baroque periods, for example. Nevertheless, the kind of resemblances suggested not only in musical aesthetics, but perhaps most importantly underlying musical compositions and practices, was of a variety of
sorts. It is definitely worthwhile to research underlying ideas of musical gestures and musical expressiveness during different periods of musical history. However, this is not the place to make such an enquiry, and I will have to get along with several examples that may briefly show different kinds of resemblances suggested.

Types of Resemblances

I will now present three different kinds of resemblances between music and affective phenomena: the resemblance to feelings, the resemblance to “speech,” and the resemblance to gestures and gaits.

First of all, it can be claimed that music presents the “morphology of feeling.” Let us present this kind of resemblance by mentioning the position of the psychologist Carroll C. Pratt. According to him, music does not represent emotions, since music shares with emotion its dynamic character and, in so doing, it possesses the properties of “feeling” itself. Hence, without considering that music is a sentient being that possesses the emotion (which, again, would be to commit the pathetic fallacy), Pratt instead maintained that the patterns of musical movement are intrinsically related to emotion, given the dynamic properties that they both possess and share.

Music sounds as though it were saturated with mood and feeling, and for that reason has for centuries been called the language of emotion. But music speaks of emotion only by way of tonal patterns which at the level of form are indistinguishable from the patterns of bodily reverberations. *Music sounds the way emotions feel.* (Pratt 1954: 296)

In Pratt’s view, the words used to describe emotions are also used to describe music’s expressiveness, which for him reveals a crucial fact: the similarity in formal dynamic character of music and emotions. These words include: agitated, calm, forceful, weak, wistful, dramatic, seductive, excited, quiet, indecisive, languid, restless, pompous, graceful, awkward, clumsy, somber, triumphant, erotic, exhilarating, martial, tripping, indecisive, yearning, stately, majestic, lugubrious, pensive, rhythmic, fluent, ecstatic, sprightly, and aspiring (Pratt 1931). According to him, these words are applied to describe music as well as to describe the way we feel emotions, because they apply in the same way to the qualities of the bodily movements we experience. In other words, he considered that the connection between music and the emotions is underwritten by a shared connection from these two categories to a third: motion.\(^{12}\)

\(^{12}\) However, Pratt did not provide a satisfactory explanation of the relationship between music and emotion, and because of this, his position was just brushed aside. Philosophers Malcolm Budd and Roger Scruton had an interesting discussion on elucidating whether music could in fact embrace movement or not, given that movement involves a spatial dimension that is not provided in the (temporal) case of music. Malcolm Budd (1983) argues against Carroll Pratt’s idea that music intrinsically involves movement, and considers that the notion of musical movement is problematic for two reasons. (1) There is not an object that moves from one place to another. Instead, a note is succeeded by another, which according to him is not sufficient to give the impression of
Pratt had the intuition that there is a bodily sensation or feeling related to (outer and inner) movements, generally said to be perceived through kinesthesis. Particular movement patterns so perceived would be the common denominator between music and emotion.\textsuperscript{13} I believe Pratt’s position is not tenable as it is (and it has certainly faced several critiques) insofar as it does not explain how movement is transduced into sound and, furthermore, he leaves great unexplained gaps in his explanation of musical space, musical movement, and how it is justified that music and these movements share the same dynamic character which, moreover, are said to correspond to emotions.\textsuperscript{14} Nevertheless, I consider that his intuition was on the right track, for the very crux of the puzzle of musical expressiveness is musical motion and its relationship with emotions. So, even though appealing to the etymology of the word “emotion” does not seem to provide enough of a foundation to establish a proper relationship between emotions and musical movement, it may now be seen to provide a good insight after all.

Historically, the very idea that music resembles feelings has been around for centuries. Effectively, in the second half of the sixteenth century, musicians and erudite scholars such as Pietro Bembo and Giosseffo Zarlino considered that stimulating the listener’s affections was the goal of music. To achieve this goal they picked up the animal spirits theory which came from Galen (as well as from Hippocrates and Aristotle before him, and one thing moving from place to place. (2) In music there are no “positions” or musical space where movement could take place. Budd claims that, while pitch organization of the sounds would be the obvious candidate for the role of position in musical space (since, according to Pratt, higher notes seem to come from a higher place in physical space than lower notes), it is only an unnecessary illusion. On the other hand, Roger Scruton (1983, 2004) claimed that musical movement must be explained in spatial terms. However, since nothing “literally moves” through “real space,” Scruton considered that musical space and movement should be better understood as metaphors. He also submitted that, nevertheless, these metaphors cannot be eliminated from the description of music without also taking away the experience of music itself. (Scruton 1983: 106) Although I do not closely follow this path of research here, I merely indicate that I would not want to accept that the spatial and motion references are nothing but metaphors. This is not a reticence born from any scorn toward metaphors, but from the fact that metaphors are concepts applied to different semantic fields, while I want to suggest that musical motion is not a concept, but a percept. That is to say that not only do we use spatial and motion terms in order to understand music and talk about it but also that we perceive it with spatial and motion properties prior to categorization. Of course, this specific point would need to be largely developed, and I am not in a position to delve deeper into it here. However, to follow the debate, see Budd (1983, 1992, 2003 and 2008); Scruton (1983, 1997, 2004); see also Davies (1994: 233-240); and De Clercq (2007).

\textsuperscript{13} The word “emotion” has its very origins in the idea of a motion that gets expelled.

\textsuperscript{14} In this respect, Stephen Davies critiques Pratt’s position (and rightly so) in that these words cannot properly be called emotions and, moreover, in that such a position reveals an impoverished account of what emotions are, for it neglects intentionality of emotions. Also, Davies doubts the scope that Pratt’s (and Langer’s for that respect) theory is actually able to explain. “I doubt that the emotions listed by Pratt are individuable in terms of the conjunction of these inner and outer motions. If they are not so, music could not be expressive because of sharing with these feelings their dynamic form. Mere similarity between the forms of musical works and the forms of the emotions cannot fully account for the inclination to describe music in such terms, given that music resembles in its dynamism many other events and processes which it is not usually said to express or present” (Davies 1994: 134-137).
Thomas Aquinas after him, but it was possibly a common belief at the time) that aimed to explain why—if the emotions belong to the soul—they are felt in the body the way they are. According to this theory, there are tiny airy corpuscles mixed with the blood that—given their subtlety—were able to access the pineal gland where the soul was supposed to be and move in accordance with the emotion the soul was feeling. These animal spirits were supposed to behave in a particular way within the body depending on the kind of emotion felt (for example, by pleasingly expanding the chest in happiness or shrinking it in sadness). Moreover, the movement of the spirits was a mechanistic explanation of why the emotions are bodily felt, as well as a phenomenological description of how they are felt. Nonetheless, the particular movement of the spirits, musicians thought, should be imitated by music, so that it could arouse the listeners with that particular emotion.

The idea that music resembles the structure of the human soul was the ground of very complex counterpoint treatises such as Zarlino’s, who was the most influential music theorist at the beginning of the 16th century. He described a system for the utilization of pitch intervals, so that they could serve the purpose of transmitting a particular emotion to the listeners. However, it was in Germany that the rigorous application of rhetorical methodology to musical composition was particularly enthusiastic. This gave rise to various treatises on musical-rhetorical figures (Figurenlehre), along with the theory of the affects in order to make them the subject of musical imitation (Affektenlehre).

Johannes Nucius (Musices poeticae sirve de compositione cantus, 1613), for example, listed a set of words that could be musically expressed with the use of musical-rhetorical figures, and this list was somewhat similar to those presented by other German Baroque theorists (and to Pratt’s): “Affective words”: rejoicing, weeping, fearing, wailing, mourning, pleading, raging, laughing, pitying. “Words of motion and place”: standing, running, dancing, resting, leaping, lifting, lowering, ascending, descending, heaven, hell, mountain abyss, heights, etc. “Adverbs of time and number”: quickly, fast, soon, slowly, early, late, twice, thrice, four times, again, once more, often, rarely; and other words such as light, day, night, darkness. This list will shed light on the discussions on musical relationship with movement that I will be undertaking in the following parts.

Johann Mattheson adhered to the animal spirits theory of passions (published by Descartes not very long before). The animal spirits would move in accordance with the emotion of the soul and thus describe a particular movement in the body. The movements that the animal spirits were supposed to make within the body were carefully characterized and were presented as an explanation of both the physiological emotional mechanisms and the phenomenological dimension of the emotion. Although he based his explanations on the resemblance music can have with the spirits’ movements—which is a theory that does not stand any longer—the examples Mattheson mentions in Der vollkommene Capellmeister

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15 Johannes Nucius (c. 1556–1620) was a German theorist and composer with great influence of Orlando di Lassus. His treatise, Musices poeticae, deals mainly with the expressive compositional mechanisms in close relation to texts (Figurenlehre).
go quite easily in accordance with intuition and with the way emotions have been dealt with throughout the history of music. Just to mention some of them:

(56) Since for example joy is an **expansion** of our soul, thus it follows reasonably and naturally that I could best express this affect by **large** and expanded intervals.

(57) Whereas if one knows that sadness is a **contraction** of these subtle parts of our body, then it is easy to see that the **small** and **smallest** intervals are the most suitable for this passion.

(58) If we consider further that love is in fact essentially a **diffusion** of the spirits, then we will rightly conform to this in composing, and use similar relationships of sounds.

(59) Hope is an **elevation** of the soul or spirits; but despair is a depression of this: all of which are things which can very naturally be represented with sound, especially when the other circumstances (tempo in particular) contribute their part. And in this way one can form a sensitive concept of all the emotions and compose accordingly. (Mattheson 1739: Part I, Chapter 3)

Thus, Mattheson considered that emotions present a particular form that has to do with the way we feel them due to the spirits’ movement within our bodies; thence, this is the “emotional form” that music should reproduce with sound so that the listener might be able to recognize the emotion. The theory of the affections common during the 17th and 18th centuries was searching for the physiological mechanisms of action and reaction that could explain the passions of the soul. Thus, a description of the mechanisms through which we feel certain emotions in a particular way was offered (*Affektenlehre*). Indeed, even though these descriptions of physiological mechanisms are mistaken (insofar as no one can defend the spirits theory today), the result was still a systematization of the descriptions of phenomenal aspects of the emotions (presumably shared by all humankind). This very idea was also picked up by the 20th century philosopher Susanne Langer:

> The tonal structures we call “music” bear a close logical similarity to the forms of human feeling—forms of growth and attenuation, flowing and stowing, conflict and resolution, speed, arrest, terrific excitement, calm, or subtle activation and dreamy lapses—not joy and sorrow perhaps, but the poignancy of either and both—the greatness and brevity and eternal passing of everything vitally felt. Such is the pattern, or logical form, of sentience; and the pattern of music is that same form worked out in pure, measured sound and silence. Music is a tonal analogue of emotive life. (Langer 1953: 27)

Anyway, what she refers to as a “logical form of sentience” is a much more diffused idea that I intend to defend here. What I want to do is merely to emphasize that one of the resemblances that have been found between music and emotions is suggested by the theory which considers that music bears the same form as emotions in a phenomenological way that has more to do with “feelings.” However, this path of thinking has been many times ridiculed insofar the spirits theory is no longer defendable, or insofar its basis is a description of the subjective experience of how emotions are felt. Nevertheless, I will suggest that a certain variation of this theory might be defended from a different perspective, but I will return to this topic later on.
At the moment, let me continue to list the different types of resemblances between music and emotions that have been supporting diverse ways to understand musical expressiveness. The next kind of resemblance is dubbed by Kivy the “speech theory,” according to which music can represent the way in which we express our emotions in speech. Music’s relationship with lyrics changed radically during the late Renaissance period, insofar as the composers themselves considered that music should follow the lyrics and not the other way around. Therefore, the idea pursued was that in order to achieve the maximum of expressiveness, music should imitate the words, be it in terms of their meaning, in terms of their sonic properties, or in terms of their rhetorical arrangement: “Combining with some judgment the intervals of the major and minor consonances with the natural and accidental movements made by the parts, we shall succeed in imitating the words with a well-understood harmony.” (Zarlino 1558: 95) This very idea was becoming increasingly important until Monteverdi, who called his music seconda prattica to differentiate it from the former (polyphonic) style that privileged music over the words.

Vincenzo Galilei, Zarlino’s disciple, claimed that it was impossible for polyphonic compositions to convey the emotional content of the texts. Galilei considered instead that the melody should be shaped to accentuate the natural inflections of the human voice while speaking. In effect, the new strategy was to model the singing voice on how the human voice would sound while experiencing the emotions described by the text.

So, for instance, a melodic line can be shaped as if it were the sobs of a person crying, as in the very famous example of Arianna’s Lament in Monteverdi’s opera Daphne. In the same way, a melodic line can also be shaped as if it were a shout of anger or of fear, for example. This path of composition emerged with Vincenzo Galilei, Jacopo Peri and Girolamo Mei among others, who were a part of what became known as the “Camerata Fiorentina” and that, as we know, settled the foundations of the opera and especially of the recitative style, for which the melody should have an improvised bearing such as the one that sung poetry has, and thus be located somewhere in between the singing and the speaking voice.

However, Kivy contends that this is a very narrow way to understand musical expressiveness, and he goes on to suggest that the resemblance to be found between music and emotion is rather a resemblance between music’s features and the appearances of emotional behavior, a resemblance that could be extended to pure music; i.e., music that does not have lyrics nor theatrical representation. Kivy will finally suggest that music can present characteristics that we hear as if they were expressive behavior of a particular emotion.

To quote Kivy’s (1989) and Davies’ (1994) examples in order to understand this third kind of resemblance, we might see the Saint Bernard’s face or the willow tree as if they were expressions of sadness, as a clear consequence of our tendency to see the world anthropomorphically. For indeed, if we see them as if they were expressing sadness, it is because the gestures we make while we undergo sadness are similar to those presented by the willow tree and the Saint Bernard’s face. However, it is not very clear how this applies to the case of music: it seems that the expressive features that we can see are not relevant to what we can actually hear in music. The relevant expressive features might be more related to sound...
and movement, to rhythm and pitch. That is what Stephen Davies proposes, as we have seen. He argues that music presents expressive features that are related to the emotions in appearance, but specifically those expressive features that are related to movement.

My overall theory, then, is this: In the first and basic case, music is expressive by presenting not instances of emotions but emotion characteristics in appearances. Our experience of musical works and, in particular, of motion in music is like our experience of the kinds of behaviour which, in human beings, gives rise to emotion characteristics in appearances. … Emotions are heard in music as belonging to it, just as appearances of emotions are present in the bearing, gait, or deportment of our fellow humans to other creatures. The range of emotions music is heard as presenting in this manner is restricted, as is also true for human appearances, to those emotions or moods having characteristic behavioural expressions: music presents the outward features of sadness or happiness in general. (Davies 1994: 239)

The primary hypothesis posed by the Resemblance Theory would be then that the straightforward recognition of the emotional behavior could substitute for the intentionality that music fails to exhibit. But how subtle can this sort of recognition of emotions be in the case of music? This is a topic we shall take up in detail later on. For now, let us take a look into the theories of emotion.

A brief look at emotions

The debate surrounding what emotions are is a very complex one that I intend to reproduce here. I will only roughly mention the different positions to the extent that it would help me to defend the hypothesis that I want to advance here, which is that in the end it is not emotions which help us to understand musical expressiveness better.

Very broadly speaking, we can say that there are mainly two types of approaches to emotions, the “cognitive approaches,” and the “physiological approaches,” although it would be a Manichean error to assume that every theory belongs to one of the two alternative perspectives in their pure form. The physiological perspective emphasizes the role of the perception of the physiological disruptions in the constitution of an emotion. Famously, William James argued against the idea that emotions are something that happens within our minds. In his article “What is an Emotion?” (1884), James strikingly suggested that the bodily disruptions experienced during an emotional episode are not the result of the emotion, but that, on the contrary, emotions are in themselves the result of the perception of the bodily disruptions. William James and Carl Lange had enormous influence on psychologists during the 20th century and, since their respective theories appeared almost at the same time and support pretty much the same idea, their theories are best known as the James-Lange theory.

An important antecedent of the research on emotions from a physiological perspective is The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals, in which Darwin extended the theory of species evolution to the field of emotions. According to him, the emotional responses are automatic and, in a way, unconscious. Paul Ekman (2003) agreed with Darwin about the
evolved expressions of emotions, and followed this approach in his own research. He undertook cross-cultural field research in order to study the association between facial expressions or gestures and emotions in different cultures. The results showed many confluences in gesture making, gesture recognition, and gesture association between the different cultures. These results support the idea that emotional facial expressions or gestures are not (or at least not only) culturally learned by imitation and opened up the debate as to the possibility of talking about basic, universal emotions.

According to Paul Ekman’s results, there are six basic emotions that can be recognized through the facial gestures that apparently we all do, even cross-culturally: happiness, sadness, fear, surprise, anger, and disgust. The general argumentation for this relies on the idea that there are evolved features of emotions, since emotions prepare us to deal with important events in our lives that may be relevant to our survival.

On the other hand, and unlike the physiological view, the cognitive perspectives emphasize the role of a relevant belief toward an object that defines and constitutes the emotion. A cognitive account of emotions can be found in the writings of philosophers Robert Solomon, Ronald de Sousa, Martha Nussbaum, and psychologists Richard Lazarus, Nico Frijda, and James Averill among others, although we can find important roots in the writings of Aristotle, the Stoics, Spinoza, Hume, and Sartre. However, it would be an error to consider them as absolutely arguing in favor of the same theory, since very important differences may be overlooked.

Nonetheless, generally speaking, the main claim held by this perspective against the physiological approach to emotions is that it is certainly a difficult task to differentiate between the diverse emotions if one is to take into account only the physiological disruptions. These theorists claim that differences in cognitive activity—and not only in feelings—are responsible for this differentiation. In effect, some different emotions share the same physiological responses and, thus, if the only parameter that we are taking into consideration is that of the physiological responses or sensations, we would have no ground to assume that they are different emotions at all.

Moreover, some of the bodily changes associated with emotional states, such as increased heart rate, copious sweating, and strenuous breathing, can also be associated with diseases, exercise, or other physiological causes. On the same basis, it would also be difficult to stipulate a differentiation between some non-emotional physiological perturbations and proper emotions, for some emotions seem to show the same bodily responses as some diseases or bodily excitations.\textsuperscript{16} This is to suggest that emotions cannot be constituted

\textsuperscript{16} Following the James-Lange theory, a large number of experiments were undertaken in search of the physiological differentiators of the emotions. One of the most quoted experiments is the one designed by Schachter and Singer (1962), in which 185 students were injected with epinephrine—adrenaline—or with a placebo. The students were told that they were injected with Suproxine, a supposed vitamin, and that the aim of the experiment was to test the consequences of the vitamin on their visual accuracy. The individuals were divided into four groups: one that had accurate information about the side effects that could be experienced by Suproxine
entirely by physiological disruptions, since there is nothing in the generated sensations that could differentiate between them, or that could distinguish them from the effects of a disease, exercise etc.

But how does cognition operate in an emotional process? It is mainly the matter of the “aboutness” or intentionality of the emotions. As we have seen, according to the cognitive approach emotions are object-directed, that is, they have intentional objects toward which they are focused. Thus the environment in its relationship with the individual is not reducible to a mechanistic input. The intentional object or event has to be appraised in a particular way in order to constitute an emotional object, and this means that it has to be considered, say, dangerous, to trigger fear in the individual.

Up to this point, I want to emphasize that both perspectives need to appeal to intentionality to explain what emotions are. Of course, it is more obvious why this is so in the cognitive approach, for the focus of such a perspective directly relies on the relevant belief held toward an object. However, the physiological approach usually also includes an appraisal mechanism in their explanations of the emotional processes, since our body reacts in a particular way according to a hard-wired, quick and dirty evaluation of a situation. Indeed, evolutionary theories contend that emotions prepare us to deal with important events in our lives and display a set of automatic actions that permit us to survive. In this case, there is a continuous interaction between the individual and her environment, which, I claim, should be considered a kind of intentionality as well.

Nevertheless, more recently there has been certain agreement in saying that emotions are processes that entail several elements: (a) an interaction between the individual and her environment, including the individual’s thoughts and body; (b) an appraisal of an event or situation; In the so-called basic or primary emotions, the appraisal of the situation is supposed to belong to one of the “core relational themes” described by Lazarus and De Sousa (e.g. threats, losses, etc.) that might represent vital significance for the individual in order to survive. These appraisals might be of different levels of complexity, from an unconscious (epinephrine), the second that were ignorant of those side effects, the third that were misinformed about the side effects, and the fourth where the people were injected with a saline solution as a placebo. After they were injected, the individuals were left with a stooge that supposedly was undertaking the same experiment. The stooge acted two different roles: the first one was to be a euphoric person and the second one an angry person. The results were that the individuals who were ignorant of the side effects and who interacted with the “angry person” tended to associate their physiological sensations—presumably caused by the epinephrine—with anger, whereas the individuals that interacted with the “euphoric person” tended to associate their physiological sensations with euphoria. The individuals that were injected with a placebo reported much less emotional reactions or no emotional states at all; and the individuals that had an accurate explanation for their physiological sensations did not associate their sensations with any emotional state. The results showed thus that given the same state of epinephrine-induced sympathetic activation, it is possible to produce in the individuals, by cognitive manipulations, the very disparate states of euphoria and anger. (Schachter & Singer 1962: 298). They concluded that it may indeed be the case that cognitive factors are major determiners of the emotional labels we apply to a common state of sympathetic arousal. Nevertheless, Jesse Prinz criticized the procedure of Schachter and Singer’s experiment, arguing that the conclusions that they have arrived at are not necessarily the only explanation of the results found (Prinz 2004a: 52; Griffiths 1997: 81-83).
“physiological” appraisal, to a very refined and conscious one; (c) the appraisal that triggers other physiological reactions such as action tendencies, ANS activity, particular behaviors, and gesture making; (d) feelings, which according to Damasio (1996) are conscious readouts of the bodily state juxtaposed with the “cognitive” images of what that state is about, but that we can understand also as the phenomenology of an emotion; (e) a continuous monitoring of the situation which may entail a re-evaluation of the situation that might change the first appraisal and “correct” the behavior exhibited. It is also to be emphasized that this is not necessarily an ordered list, since all of these elements interact with each other and are processes in themselves as well, and cannot be considered as mere add-on components.

It should be noticed though that emotions are not the only kind of affective phenomena, among which we should also count preferences, feelings, moods, attitudes, and personal traits (Scherer & Coutinho 2013: 125). Of them, I will now refer briefly to moods, as they—among feelings—are also candidates for accounting for musical expressiveness (at least to a certain extent). As Paul Ekman notices (1994), moods differ from emotions in several important respects: First, moods seem to last longer than emotional episodes. In this sense, they work as a limitation of the flexibility to experience emotions that go in accordance with the existing affective disposition. A mood then would be more like a general affection, which lacks intentionality as well. Thus, a mood does not seem to have an intentional object and, therefore, while being in a particular mood, we also fail to express a particular belief that could justify our affective attitude. Here is the distinction between emotions and moods in Nico Fridja’s words:

Affective states are composed of all the above: of a particular affect, a particular appraisal, a particular state of action readiness, with or without corresponding motor involvement, and a particular pattern of physiological response. They may also include a conscious awareness of the state of appraisal, a felt action readiness, and awareness of one’s bodily response. A particular emotion can be described in those terms.

Moods, too, can be described in those terms. There is a difference, however: In the states that we call emotions, affect, appraisal and action readiness are object-focused, whereas in those that we call moods these elements lack such a focus. Depressed mood can be understood as diffuse negative affect, a generalized absence of goals for striving, and generalized low inclination (or even disinclination) to undertake action, or to relate to the environment. (Fridja 1994: 61)

However, even though it could also be argued that moods have indeed an intentional object (albeit a very general one, such as the world as a whole), the degree of articulation of the intentional object may also be considered as a parameter of differentiation between the diverse affective phenomena. If this is so, the differentiation between moods and emotions would stand, but the extent to which moods can actually help us in explaining musical expressiveness remains to be analyzed. Indeed, given that moods either lack intentionality or have very general intentional objects, the subtlety they can account for is very limited.

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17 For further details on the discussion see Ekman (1994, 2003), Fridja (1994).
Back to the Resemblance Theory

Bearing in mind what the Resemblance Theory requires, we can see that the next challenge for a musical expressiveness account according to an evolutionary approach to emotions would be that only six basic emotions exhibit certain general features that have proven to be universal. However, that would allow us to ascertain the resemblance between music and but a few emotions, whose number is ill-suited to cover the scope of the subtlety of musical expressiveness we would want to account for. We would be allowed to say that music exhibits the expressive qualities relevant to happiness or sadness, but we could barely say anything more.

Indeed, the objector might reply that the fact that there are only six distinct universal emotions does not necessarily entail that they are not enough to account for music’s expressive subtlety. It could be that there is a wide range of different emotional experiences within the scope of those emotions. Surely not every experience of, say, happiness is identical with every other. On the other hand, it could also be that the representation of those emotions is what accepts a larger range of subtlety. In response to Robert Stecker’s critiques of his theory (1999), Davies actually maintains that, even though his theory only accounts for music being expressive of general emotions of the sadness and happiness varieties, it is highly particular in the manner by which the emotion’s characteristics are presented.

The sadness is not special as such, but it is a sadness that is presented in a very specific note-sequence. If the sadness strikes some people as hard to describe, I think this is because they expect they should be able to elaborate from a phenomenological perspective on the sensational character of an episode of sadness, or expound on the attitudes, objects, and settings that usually give such an experience its distinctive character. These things are absent from the musical case, and so are not available for description, but this does not mean that we cannot be more specific about the expressiveness we hear. The sadness of Chopin’s funeral march is not the same as that of Beethoven’s, but the difference lies not in the emotion of which the music is expressive but in the concrete detail from which arises the musical realization of that expressive appearance. In my view, what music tells us is the way emotion-characteristics sound. This recalls Carroll Pratt’s aphorism, which certainly was a perceptive one, but which could not but seem empty for the absence of an explanation in his own account of how music could sound as the emotions feel. (Davies 1999: 287)

As we see, what Davies extends is the subtlety in the representation of the same kind of emotion, not the range of emotions. So he does not really go on to say that it is a specific kind of happiness that we are experiencing, but that the same happiness is presented in different ways. That would be to say that different musically-representable characteristics amount to the same emotion. Even though I think that such a claim could work, I contend that it has not been proven, and certainly the empirical data from Ekman’s research is not enough to account for the subtlety in the (universal) different expressions of the same happiness. If it is a resemblance relationship between two terms, how come that one term stays static while the other accepts variations and the resemblance relationship is not broken? Of course, it could be said that insofar as the general features of that emotion are resembled, the requirements for the representation of that particular emotion would be
sufficiently met. And so it would not really matter that other characteristics are added to
the music; it would still resemble that emotion. Fair enough, but in that case music’s subtle
expressiveness would not be explained by the resemblance suggested by the theory. On
the other hand, if we want to say that the range of musical expressiveness captures the
subtlety of differing experiences of happiness, sadness, etc., we would have to account for
different experiences, their characteristic behavior, and music’s ability to resemble it.
Nevertheless, I consider that such explanation is still lacking.

Kivy responds to a similar critique, according to which his theory is not able to account
for music’s expressive subtlety. He begins by differentiating between gross expressive
properties (GEPs), moderate expressive properties (MEPs), and subtle expressive proper-
ties (SEPs). However, the difference between GEPs, MEPs, and SEPs does not seem pre-
cise enough. We might say that GEPs refer to general or expressive properties, a MEP
would probably require a set of conventions to become more specific, and a SEP would
require semantic content.

Newcomb apparently thinks that the only expressive properties The Corded Shell can
countenance are ones at the level of generality of “sad” and “happy.” Perhaps there are
passages in the book that suggest that; but it is not the position I hold, as I have said
previously. Thus, I certainly believe that in pure instrumental music we can distinguish
(say) between triumphant joy, or exuberant good spirits, and calm or contemplative joy;
between funeral melancholy and anguished melancholy; between violent anger and a less
violent kind; and so on. So let us say that, along with geps, The Corded Shell also coun-
tenances properties more subtle than they, but not so subtle as seps: I will call them “meps”
(for moderate expressive properties). (Kivy 1989: 183–184)

Here is a perhaps better differentiation between GEPs, MEPs, and SEPs in Davies’ words:

A MEP is usually a more specific or complexly qualified version of a GEP. By contrast,
a SEP is likely to be a particular instance of an emotion, tied in its individuality to the
context of the person experiencing it, the detail of its particular object, and so on. New-
comb’s SEPs are ineffable in instrumental music because we have no direct access to what
makes them the distinctive individuals they are; we have no idea, for example, of the emo-
tional object of the feeling expressed in the music. Newcomb thinks, that is, that the emo-
tions expressed in music are no less specific than are actual instances of object-directed
emotions, though the music indicates no particular object or context. It is the possibility
of SEPs of this type in instrumental music that Kivy rejects as incoherent. In my opinion
he is right to do so. (Davies 1994: 251)

It seems to me that too many things have gone wrong in Kivy’s differentiation between mu-
ic’s expressive properties according to their degree of subtlety. First, it is not really clear
what exactly constitutes the difference between MEPs and GEPs. Second, even if we concede
it, it is not clear that the examples he cites of MEPs are accounted for in his theory. Finally,
it is not proved why we should necessarily understand SEPs in terms of semantic content.

I am saying that, in part, Crime and Punishment is about psychology and Paradise Lost is
about political matters; that they convey psychological and political views, respectively.
Small wonder, then, that in seeing the expressive part of music as “content” or “meaning”
or “significance” Newcomb finds my theory hopelessly inadequate as an account of musical expressiveness. And small wonder, too, that he sees music as possessing seps; because it is only through something like semantic content that, I believe, and artwork could ever come to possess expressive properties so specific and fine tuned. (Kivy 1989: 186)

Kivy rejects Newcomb’s critique about the failure of his theory to account for non-anthropomorphically-animated features, which, according to Newcomb, would allow us to understand subtle expressive properties in music (SEPs) (Kivy 1989: 177–209). Newcomb thinks that there are some references to water, glass, or fire that we can hear in music and that their expression is subtle. Hence, as we can predict, Kivy simply argues that even if pure music were capable of representing water, glass or fire, that would not mean that it expresses them. Of course, those things are not emotions to be expressed. However, there is a good intuition in Newcomb’s critique, since the scope of musical expressiveness seems much broader and at the same time much more specific than the resemblance to general basic emotions allows us to explain.

Yet Kivy suggests that we should stay within the scope of what his theory is meant to explain. It permits explanation of general expressive properties (GEPs) and moderate expressive properties (MEPs) if one is to introduce conventions and references that do not originally belong to pure, instrumental music. Can music possess subtle expressive properties? How subtle can we go in saying so? Are we going against intuition if we deny that music can be expressive in a subtle way?

I want, by any means, to overlook the possible significance of conventions in musical expressiveness, but at the moment, and for the purposes of this paper, I prefer to come back to what is possible to grasp in, say, a natural way; that is, to the musical features that we straightaway recognize as being like emotional behavior and, therefore, as explainable within the scope of the Resemblance Theory. However, what—according to the cognitive theories of emotions—seems to be the case is that what makes an emotion specific is the relevant belief it involves and, furthermore, that this relevant belief needs a particular object to be stated toward; i.e. it is intentional. But music, as we have seen, is not intentional and/or our emotional arousal lacks an intentional object. Thus, music could not be expressive of SEPs.

Davies’ theory is more focused on the expressive qualities that have to do with movement than Kivy’s. I agree with Davies in this respect. Nevertheless, I still believe that a relationship between movement and emotions should be further explained in order to justify our inference from the perception of a musical movement to an emotion. The problem remains in this way: We can experience certain movement, such acceleration and sudden stopping, but that does not entitle us to conclude that such a movement corresponds to a recognizable emotional behavior which constitutes expressive qualities of emotion.

The necessity to explain musical expressive subtleness is broadly acknowledged, although not always finely tackled. For example, Martha Nussbaum (2001) considers that even though a musical work cannot represent or contain concrete emotions (as some person’s particular sorrow), “its emotional content itself may be highly specific, and certainly in no
way vague or vacuous.” The work captures, say, not simply a pain or a kind of sorrow, but a very specific one: *that* pain, the one crystallized in Vinteuil’s phrase, for example. Yet, again, the difficulty is that this step cannot just be assumed.

As discussed before, the cognitive approach of emotions put forth a counterargument against the physiological approach that claimed that the thought entailed in an emotional process (along with its particular intentional object) is what makes an emotion a specific one, so that it is impossible to determine an emotion only by its physiological features. Thus it makes no sense to say that a person is feeling angry, if she does not think that an offense has taken place. Furthermore, to make such a consideration the person has to hold a particular intentional object, so that there are no “general offenses,” but rather, that she gets angry about a particular situation she evaluates as an offense.

That is the main distinction between moods and emotions, as we have seen. Indeed, it is generally accepted that moods hold “general objects” and that they may be very general. Thus one can be “in a sad mood” without having a particular reason (or at least not a conscious one). But if we say—as Nussbaum does—that music can hold general intentional objects, how does it manage to be very emotion-specific at the same time? Do we need, perhaps, to appeal to the definiteness of every single feeling? If so, how does this feeling “crystallize” in a musical work? This is the step that Nussbaum takes for granted and that I think is the main riddle of musical expressiveness. Indeed, we don’t really want a set of rules, catalogues, or techniques of musical figures as musical crystallized emotions, but to leave it to the “mystery of art” does not help either.

**Subtle movement gestures**

The imitation of emotional gestures, as acknowledged by Davies and Kivy, has the limitation of providing only an explanation for the resemblance of few emotions (probably restricted to sadness and happiness). Nevertheless, musical expressiveness seems to be much more subtle than that. However, the subtlety to which I refer does not concern the “higher order emotions” such as jealousy (which apparently cannot be imitated with music without providing a plot that embraces an intentional object). Instead, the subtlety that I am referring to concerns the particularities of movements.

The problem remains this: We can experience certain movement, such as acceleration and sudden stopping, but are we allowed to jump from that to argue that such movements correspond to recognizable emotional behavior that could constitute expressive qualities of emotion?

My claim is that the Resemblance Theory can, indeed, explain certain features of musical expressiveness that have to do with emotions, but that some of these features are just not in a direct relationship with our emotional life. That is to say, certain movements that we find (very) expressive in music do not really have a one-to-one correlation with any of emotion’s features.
Kivy argues that this is because “expressiveness” just is not the correct concept to use in those cases. Instead, I suggest that the Resemblance Theory should extend its scope to include feelings of movement, even though they do not correspond to any particular emotion. Many gestures associated with musical expressiveness might not necessarily be associated with emotions, but rather with certain feelings of movement. I am not denying that a resemblance to emotions might occur and figure importantly in an explanation of musical expressiveness. My claim is instead that there is at least a realm of music’s subtle expressiveness that it cannot explain, because full-blooded emotions have other components that are simply not reflected in music. Therefore, many of the musical expressive gestures have to be overlooked in the theory of musical expressiveness because they simply lack features that are needed to maintain a resemblance to emotions.

I do not intend to defend Newcomb’s critique, for it is clear enough that intentionality is necessary for an emotion to be specific, and that it is simply not exhibited in the case in music. And if I see a glimpse of truth in Newcomb’s words, it is not because I claim that musical expressiveness relies on its ability to represent fire or water. Instead, what I think water and fire have in common in this case is a certain movement pattern that is very likely to be reproduced by music and that can be understood in terms of feelings of movement within the Resemblance Theory of musical expressiveness, as suggested by the first kind of resemblance we reviewed here.

Many gestures associated with musical expressiveness might not necessarily be associated with emotions, but with certain feelings of movement. What I am suggesting is that the Resemblance Theory, which explains musical expressiveness, which in turn is limited to the emotion’s appearances that can be resembled in music and that can be recognized, should be extended to include general feelings of movement. I am not denying that a resemblance to emotions might occur and have an important say in what comes to explain musical expressiveness. My claim is instead that there is at least a realm of music’s subtle expressiveness that it cannot explain, because emotions need other elements that are simply not exhibited by music. Therefore, many of the musical expressive gestures have to be overlooked in the theory of musical expressiveness because they simply lack characteristics that are needed to maintain a resemblance to emotions. Indeed, if one is to suggest a resemblance between two terms, the resemblance has to be specific enough to establish a bond, so that one term refers to the other and not just to a vague bunch of others, because in such a case we would not be allowed to say that the resemblance is really established between those two specific terms.

That is what happens in the case of musical resemblance. In our explanation of musical expressiveness we have had to get rid of most of the subtle gestures music presents, because they just do not refer to any particular emotion. However, “feeling” is a much wider concept that would allow us to suggest a more specific resemblance that could capture the subtlety of certain musical movements. Furthermore, such a move would also carry the benefit of avoiding the counter-argument of the lack of intentionality in music or the
lack of a relevant belief necessary to constitute the emotion, or why, when we are supposedly emotionally aroused by music, we do not exhibit the behavioral tendencies associated with that particular emotion.

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After the Rite / Po obrzęzie


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