

The introduction

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Without an exaggeration we can adapt an expression “from a manifesto to progress” as a motto for neurophenomenology. As the manifesto can serve an article: ‘Neurophenomenology – a methodological remedy for the hard problem’ (Varela 1996/2000). The aim of the research program initiated by the late Francisco Varela was to naturalize phenomenology in the frame of neurobiology, and to apply it to the different areas of theory and practice in science and philosophy (embodiment, enactivism). It meets certain challenges like the explanatory gap or the problem of clarity and credibility of the subjective reports. Hence one could easily fall into doubts concerning usefulness and the cognitive possibilities of phenomenology itself, which have been already described by Daniel Dennett (2007) (who has proposed an alternative heterophenomenology) and Thomas Metzinger (2004).

However those who has developed the discussed program act with the courage and bravado. Their approach focuses on practical investigations taking into account a specificity and chances of the first-person data source, so they have decided to make a pragmatic adaptation of the classical phenomenological theories without blinking an eye (Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1991; Petitot et al. 1999; Thompson et al. 2005). Whereas Husserl has located phenomenology beyond the science, Varela and his colleagues claim it just should be placed back there!

Although it doesn't seem typical for an introduction, I am not going to present here a full characteristic of the articles of Francisco Varela, Robert Hanna, Shaun Gallagher and Evan Thompson, for it has been accurately done by my colleague in the text that summarizes the triptych¹. I prefer to invite you to a non-critical (or perhaps pre-critical) reading of these texts. However I want to emphasize an expansion of Varela's program into new areas of research, disregarding the conventions (including scientific ones) and still not becoming the quasi-science or the scientific margin.

Neurophenomenology explores many different domains of human cognitive activity including Far Eastern methods of improving mental skills, which I want to underline here. Meditation has become an important object of studies and seems to be a promising way of optimization of mind's abilities treated as a research tool. People who are engaged in meditation, like Buddhist practitioners, or laics with an experience in meditating, have been wonderful source of the reliable, factual and clear first-person reports. The opportunities of ordinary introspection turned out to have less explanatory power in that matter (Lutz et al. 2005).

Interesting research on meditation has been conducted in Waisman Laboratory in Madison (at the Institute of Psychology of Wisconsin University, USA). They focus on reports obtained from the regular studies on brains of the meditating persons, with the use of the newest neuroimaging techniques, supplemented by the careful analysis of the first-person data. Especially significant reports has been provided by French neurologist Antoine Lutz and his group of specialists. It's also worth to mention such researchers as Richard J. Davidson (the head of that laboratory), Evan Thompson, John D. Dunne, Jean-Philippe Lachaux and Diego Cosmelli (see: <http://brainimaging.waisman.wisc.edu/~lutz>).

I am not able to answer the question if neurophenomenology can realize its postulates from the original manifesto. It is more important for me

¹ Paweł Gładziejewski: *Neurophenomenology: an introduction to discussion* (Gładziejewski 2010).

that we can see an empirical progress here and the scientific boldness in the methodology. There is no doubt that the harsh problem of consciousness cannot recently complain about the lack of new sources of lightning, therefore we should look closer at new areas of studies and methodologies which have been proposed by neurophenomenology.

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