Affordances in Dennett’s From Bacteria to Bach and Back

Avant, Vol. XI, No. 2, doi: 10.26913/avant.2020.02.05
published under license CC BY-NC-ND 3.0

Zuzanna Rucińska
Centre for Philosophical Psychology, Department of Philosophy
University of Antwerp, Belgium
zuzannaaleksandra.rucinska @ uanwerpen.be

Received 6 June 2019; accepted 2 July 2019; published Online First 26 January 2020

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Abstract: The purpose of this commentary is to elucidate the various roles that affordances play in Dennett’s (2017) From Bacteria to Bach and Back. By looking at the multitude of ways that affordances are mentioned throughout the book, this commentary hopes to uncover the fruitful ways of talking about affordances in the philosophy of cognitive science.

Keywords: Daniel Dennett; From Bacteria to Bach and Back; affordances; cognitive science; explanation

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