Relations between self-understanding and other-understanding: similarities and interactions

Avant, Vol. XI, No. 2, doi: 10.26913/avant.2020.02.07
published under license CC BY-NC-ND 3.0

Adrianna Smurzyńska
Jagiellonian University
adrianna.smurzynska @ gmail.com

Received 4 January 2019; accepted 18 November 2019; published Online First 2 February 2020

Abstract: The aim of this article is to examine the relation between self-understanding and other-understanding. In this context, three theories of mentalization will be considered: theory theory, simulation theory and the person model theory. Two types of issues will be analyzed: (I) whether the abilities involved in self- and other-understanding are identical or diverse and (II) whether the abilities of self- and other-understanding are distinct or intertwined. These questions will be applied to theory theory, simulation theory and the person model theory; they will also be placed in the context of selected research concerning this issue.

Keywords: mentalization; self-understanding; other-understanding; theory theory; simulation theory; person model theory

References

Baron-Cohen, S. (1995). Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism on Theory of Mind. Cambridge: MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/4635.001.0001

Bogdan, R. J. (2005). Why self-ascriptions are difficult and develop late. In B. F. Malle & S. D. Hodges (Eds.), Other minds: How humans bridge the divide between self and others (pp. 190-206). New York: Guilford Press.

Boyer, P., Robbins, P., Jack, A. I. (2005). Varieties of self-systems worth having. Consciousness and Cognition, 14, 647-660. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2005.08.002

Brandt, S., Buttelmann, D., Lieven, E., Tomasello, M. (2016). Children’s understanding of first-and third-person perspectives in complement clauses and false-belief tasks. Journal of experimental child psychology, 151, 131-143. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2016.03.004

Carruthers, P. (2009). How we know our own minds: The relationship between mindreading and metacognition. Behavioral and brain sciences, 32, 121-138. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X09000545

Damon, W., Hart, D. (1982). The development of self-understanding from infancy through adolescence. Child development, 53, 841-864. https://doi.org/10.2307/1129122

Decety, J., Grèzes, J. (2006). The power of simulation: imagining one’s own and other’s behavior. Brain research, 1079, 4-14. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brainres.2005.12.115

Fonagy, P., Luyten, P. (2009). A developmental, mentalization-based approach to the understanding and treatment of borderline personality disorder. Development and psychopathology, 21, 1355-1381. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0954579409990198

Frith, C. D., Frith, U. (2006). The neural basis of mentalizing. Neuron, 50, 531 – 534. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2006.05.001

Gallagher, S. (2008). Direct perception in the intersubjective context. Consciousness and Cognition, 17, 535-543. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2008.03.003

Gallagher, S., Hutto, D. (2008). Understanding others through primary interaction and narrative practice. The shared mind: Perspectives on intersubjectivity, 12, 17-38. https://doi.org/10.1075/celcr.12.04gal

Goldman, A. (2006). Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading (Philosophy of Mind). Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0195138929.001.0001

Goldman, A. I. (2009). Mirroring, mindreading, and simulation. In J. Pineda (Ed.) Mirror Neuron Systems: The Role of Mirroring Processes In Social Cognition (pp. 311-330). Humana Press. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-59745-479-7_14

Goldman, A. I. (2012). Theory of Mind. In E. Margolis, R. Samuels & S. P. Stich (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science (pp. 402-424). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195309799.013.0017

Goldman, A., Mason, K. (2007). Simulation. In P. Thagard (Ed.), Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science (pp. 267-293). Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-044451540-7/50026-8

Gopnik, A. (1993). How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality. Behavioral & Brain Sciences, 16, 29-113. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00028636

Gopnik, A. (1996), Theories and Modules; Creation Myths, Developmental Realities, and Neurath’s Boat. In P. Carruthers & P. K. Smith (Eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind (pp. 169-183). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511597985.012

Gopnik, A., Astington, J. W. (1988). Children’s understanding of representational change and its relation to the understanding of false belief and the appearance-reality distinction. Child development, 59, 26-37. https://doi.org/10.2307/1130386

Gordon, R. M. (1995). Simulation without introspection or inference from me to you. In M. Davies & T. Stone (Eds.), Mental Simulation (pp. 53-67). Blackwell.

Gordon, R. M. (2008). Beyond mindreading. Philosophical explorations, 11, 219-222. https://doi.org/10.1080/13869790802239250

Guerini, R., Marraffa, M. (2015). Mentalization and Self-Identity: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 6, 196-197. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01022

Hernik, M., Fearon, P., Fonagy, P. (2009). There must be more to development of mindreading and metacognition than passing false belief tasks. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32, 147-148. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X0900065X

Hodges, S. D. (2005). Is how much you understand me in your head or mine. In B. F. Malle & S. D. Hodges (Eds.), Other minds: How humans bridge the divide between self and others (pp. 298-309). New York: Guilford Press.

Hyslop, A. (2016). Other Minds. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/other-minds/>.

Keysers, C., Gazzola, V. (2008). Unifying social cognition. In J. A. Pineda (Ed.) Mirror neuron systems (pp. 1-35). Humana Press. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-59745-479-7_1

Krueger, J., Overgaard, S. (2012). Seeing subjectivity: Defending a perceptual account of other minds. ProtoSociology: Consciousness and subjectivity, 47, 239-262.

Mills, C. M., Danovitch, J. H. (2009). Getting to know yourself… and others. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32, 154-155. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X09000739

Mitchell, J. P., Macrae, C. N., Banaji, M. R. (2006). Dissociable medial prefrontal contributions to judgments of similar and dissimilar others. Neuron, 50, 655-663. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2006.03.040

Newen, A. (2015). Understanding Others: The Person Model Theory. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds.), Open MIND: 26(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group.

Newen, A., Schlicht, T. (2009). Understanding other minds: A criticism of Goldman’s Simulation Theory and an outline of the Person Model Theory. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 79, 209-242. https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-90000865

Nichols, S., Stich, S. (2003). Mindreading. An Integrated Account of Presence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds. Oxford: Clarendon Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0198236107.001.0001

Perner, J. (1991). Understanding the representational mind. The MIT Press.

Premack, D., Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?. Behavioral and brain sciences, 1, 515-526. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00076512

Robbins, P. (2004). Knowing Me, Knowing You. Theory of Mind and the Machinery of Introspection. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 11, 129-43.

Vogeley, K., Newen, A. (2009). Consciousness of oneself and others in relation to mental disorders. In S. J. Wood, N. B. Allen, C. Pantelis (Eds.) The neuropsychology of mental illness (pp. 408-413). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511642197.035

Waytz, A., Mitchell, J. P. (2008). Two mechanisms for simulating other minds: dissociations between mirroring and self-projection. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 20, 197-200. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721411409007

Wellman, H. M. (1990). The child’s theory of mind. MIT Press.

Wimmer, H., Perner, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children’s understanding of deception. Cognition, 13, 103-12. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(83)90004-5 “Avant” journal – the task financed under the contract 711/P-DUN/2019 from the funds of the Minister of Science and Higher Education for the dissemination of science. Czasopismo „Avant” – zadanie finansowane w ramach umowy 711/P-DUN/2019 ze środków Ministra Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego przeznaczonych na działalność upowszechniającą naukę.

Relations between self-understanding and other-understanding: similarities and interactions

“Avant” journal – the task financed under the contract 711/P-DUN/2019 from the funds of the Minister of Science and Higher Education for the dissemination of science.

Czasopismo „Avant” – zadanie finansowane w ramach umowy 711/P-DUN/2019 ze środków Ministra Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego przeznaczonych na działalność upowszechniającą naukę.