Avant, Vol. XII, No. 2, https://doi.org/10.26913/avant.2021.02.01
published under license CC BY-NC-ND 3.0
Witold Marzęda 
University of Silesia in Katowice
witold.marzeda@us.edu.pl
Received 18 September 2020; accepted 16 July 2021; published Online First 22 September 2021.
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Abstract: The problem of mysterianism can be considered from two perspectives. The first is the attitude to the question of determinability of the mystery or the issue of consciousness that can be called the mysterian dispute. The second issue is the formulation of the problem itself, which can be called the limitation theorem. In the paper the author describes from the second point of view and concludes that problem of mysterianism is based on equivocation. On the one hand, the explanation is sometimes understood as a complete solution to the problem (as when one can present a correct proof of a theorem), on the other, as acceptable and satisfying the conditions of a well-formed theory. There is no one and definite explaining theory – In the sense that the classic ideal of science, which is based on the architectural model of knowledge, gives to the term definitive explanation. At the same time, there are many explanatory concepts, empirical hypotheses, and speculations that explain mental phenomena.
Keywords: mysterianism; limits of knowledge; philosophy of mind, Brentano’s thesis; limitation theorem
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