Normativity of Anticipation and Normativity of Prediction. Two Approaches: Phenomenology and Predictive Processing Theory

Michał Piekarski

Abstract


The aim of the present article is (1) to analyse the normative character of anticipations described by phenomenology; (2) to demonstrate, within the framework of the predictive processing approach, that predictions fulfill a specific normative function in the perceptual process; and (3) to justify the thesis according to which the analyses of normative mechanisms performed by investigators of predictive processing are more effective and give better explanations of normativity than those offered by phenomenology. I would like to justify the thesis that explanations in the predictive processing approach are normative in nature. They are like that because prediction mechanisms themselves are normative.

Keywords


perception; prediction; anticipation; normativity; predictive processing; phenomenology; explanation.

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References


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