Awareness of Self Attention (translated by Krzysztof Gajda)
Abstract
Internal sensations, especially organic ones, are not only the foundation of our consciousness of life and self but also an integral part of each feeling. This is probably the origin of the genuine affinity between feelings and consciousness of life and self, an affinity that manifests itself even in speech. Indeed, the ex- pression “sense of self” is more natural than saying “representing” or even “im- agining one’s self”. It is also easier and neater to talk in French about “sentiment du moi” than “representation du moi”; the expression “das Ichgefühl” is less grating than “die Ichvorstellung”, the latter being rather used to mean the con- ceived self as opposed to the self of which one is conscious all the time. The self is not a feeling, however, if only because there are no feelings that would be equally constant or, to be more precise, that would recur with equal constancy. Even so, we can say it is closer to emotive states than to any representation or mental image. [...]
Keywords
Full Text:
PDFReferences
Dugas, L. (1898). Un Cas de Depersonnalisation. Revue Philosophique (XLV).
Dumas, G. (1900) La Tristesse et la Joie. F. Alcan, ed. Paris.
Refbacks
- There are currently no refbacks.
Copyright (c) 2018 Jan Górski