On the concept of the normative in the assessment of mental disorder
Abstract
In Marco Stier's article “Normative preconditions for the assessment of mental disorder,” the concept of the normative occupies a central role (Stier, 2013). Stier states that mental disorders have an irreducible normative element built in, expressible through various “normative frames of reference” they are tied to. Following his two main theses, he thinks that these frameworks shape what counts as deviant as well as non-deviant behavior. He takes this as evidence that we have to specify mental disorders at the mental level, and thus will never be able to give a purely physical account of them. Unfortunately, he nowhere makes clear what he takes to be the content of the concept of the normative, although he gives some hints about his understanding at various passages. In what follows, I will explore three of his implicit suggestions on the essential linkages his concept of the normative bears to other concepts: the non-natural, the non-objective, and the relative. I shall argue that it is questionable that this understanding leads to the conclusion Stier aims at—that the specification of mental disorders cannot be succeed on the physical but only the mental level due to the impact of normative considerations in this enterprise
Keywords
concept of mental disorder; non-natural; objectivity; relativity; normativity
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Mackie, J. (1977). Ethics. Inventing Right and Wrong. Penguin: London.
Parfit, D. (2011). On What Matters. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Shafer-Landau, R. (2003). Moral Realism. A Defence. Oxford University Press: Oxford. DOI: 10.1093/0199259755.001.0001.
Stier, M. (2013). Normative preconditions for the assessment of mental disorder. Frontiers in Psychology 4(611). DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00611.
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