Two normative orders: a commentary on the discussion on the intentionality of action

Andrzej Waleszczyński

Abstract


The characteristic asymmetry of attributes of intentionality which is known as the sideeffect effect and Butler’s problem has been explained by the impact of moral considerations on judgments of intentional action. The commentary on this discussion draws attention to an alternative solution. It uses the concept of moral agency and the possibility of the existence of two types of normative orders: moral and non-moral. They are characterized by different conditions of applying the concept of intentional action. In situations where there are negative effects, there is a "normative tension" between these types of normativity. Therefore, normative competences that would be responsible for separating normative orders may play an important role in the judgments of intentional action.

Keywords


Intentional action; moral impact; side-effect effect; Knobe effect; Butler;s problem; Joshua Knobe; Ronald Butler; normativity; normative competences; normative orders

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References


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